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David  Alan  Aschauer,  who  was  among  the  earliest  researchers  to  quantify 
the  statistical  relationship  between  public  infrastructure  investment  and  pri- 
vate  sector  productivity,  states  that  the  slower  rate  of  productivity  growth 
since  the  early  197Os-coupled  with  an  aging  population,  the  declining 
share  of  workers  to  the  total  population,  and  other  demographic  factors- 
poses  a  dilemma  for  policy-makers  interested  in  strengthening  the  long- 
term,  relative  position  of  the  U.S.  in  an  increasingly  competitive  global  eco- 
nomic  environment. 
Aschauer  regards  public  infrastructure  (comprising  streets  and  highways, 
mass  transit?  water  and  sewer  systems,  etc.)  to  be  a  factor  of  production. 
The  public  capital  stock,  which  equaled  46.1%  of  GNP  in  1960,  amounted 
to  less  than  41%  of  GNP  in  1990.  H ence,  the  declining  pace  of  capital 
accumulation  may  be  responsible  for  explaining  both  “a  very  substantial 
portion  of  the  productivity  slowdown..  . and  cross-country  differences  in 
productivity  growth.” 
Critics  charge  that  the  magnitude  of  Aschauer’s  statistical  correlation 
between  public  capital  and  private  sector  productivity  is  implausible. 
Moreover,  he  is  accused  of  omitting  variables  that  may  better  explain  the 
productivity  slowdowny  and  dismissing  the  prospect  of  reverse  causation  in 
his  research.  Aschaucr  responds  by  stating  that  the  mere  existence  of  other 
explanations  does  not  inherently  challenge  the  value  of  public  capital:  the 
inconsistent  methodologies  of  other  researchers  (e.g.,  various  definitions  of 
“public  capital’*  and  the  differing  geographic  scope  of  studies)  make  the 
critics’  arguments  less  cogent. 
Aschauer  recognizes  that  he  must  ext-end  his  thesis  to  address  the  optimality 
of  the  public  capital  stock  vis-S-vis  maximizing  private  sector  productivity. 
He  provides  evidence  of  the  underprovision  of  public  capital  by  citing  a  rate 
of  return  on  public  capital  in  cxccss  of  that  to  private  capital.  In  fact, 
Aschauer  claims  that  Was long  as  the  returns  to  infrastructure  investment 
exceed  the  growth  rate  of  the  economy,  an  increase  in  public  investment 
will  tilt  the  national  consumption  profile  toward  the  future...and  raise  liv- 
ing  standards  in  the  next  century.” In  conrrast,  Douglas  Holtz-Eakin  dismisses  the  conventional 
a  Federal  infrastructure  program.  Holtz-Eakin  asserts  that: 
arguments  for 
l  A  large-scale  public  infrastructure  program  has  no  appreciable 
effect  on  produc&ity  growth. 
l  In  the  current  fiscal  climate  of  scarce  Federal  resources,  a  Federal 
infrastructure  is  not  consistent  with  the  goal  of  deficit  reduction. 
l  There  are  better  infrastructure  strategies  than  new  spending  and 
massive  construcCon  pr0gram.s. 
l  Policies  aimed  at  increasing  private  rather  than  public  invesrment 
will  have  a  more  positive  impact  on  1J.S.  compeGCvene,ss. 
Holtz-Eakin  cautions  against  a  Federal  infrastructure  policy,  stating  that 
the  Wprovision  of  infrastructure  has  been  the  province  of  state  and  local 
governments,  on  the  grounds  that  local  officials  are  better  able  to  judge  the 
needs  and  desires  of  their  local  constituents.”  Holtz-Eakin’s  critics  charge 
that  local  decision-makers  are  unabJe  to  capture  interstate  productivity 
spillovers,  but  the  author  asserts  that  no  empirical  evidence  suggests  the 
existence  of  such  spillover  effects. 
Rather  than  authorize  new  ‘spending  programs,  Holtz-Eakin  favors  more 
efficiently  pricing  (e.g.?  user  fees)  the  existing  stock  of  infrastructure,  and 
submits  that  infrastructure  maintenance-  not  new  construction-should 
bc  our  focus.  Given  the  deficit-reduction-driven  poli.tical  climate’of  fiscal 
restraint?  all  Federal  expenditures  are  subject  to  being  disguised  as  invest- 
ments.  Holtz-Eakin  believes  the  distinction  between  expenditures  and 
investment-at  least  in  the  debate  over  the  return  on  pubIic  infrastructure- 
may  be  artificial. 
Holtz-Eakin  insists,  though,  that  his  results  =do  not  imply  that  the  large 
stock  of  infrastructure  in  the  United  States  provides  no  benefits.  Instead,  the 
results  say  that  a  broad-based  spending  program  for  additional  infrastruc- 
turc  is  unlikely  to  augment  economy-wide  productivity  growth.”  Hence, 
Holtz-Eakin  would  not  necessarily  quarrel  with  other  justifications  (c.g., 
social  good)  for  increased  infrastructure  expenditures-just  don’t  cite 
improved  productivity  as  a  rationale. Contents 
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The  role  of  public  capital  has  been  widely 
discussed  during  the  postwar  period,  with  the 
emphasis  on  the  cunning  ability  of  legislators 
to  secure  pet  projects  {and  constituents’ 
votes)  within  their  districts.  However,  the 
productivity  slowdown  in  our  country- 
which  began  in  the  early  197Os-has  altered 
the  way  many  Americans  think  about  public 
capital.  The  debate  now  addresses  the  effects 
of  public  infrastructure  investment  on  private 
sector  productivity  and,  consequently,  Ameri- 
can  competitiveness  in  the  global  economy. 
The  seminal  work  of  David  Alan  Aschauer 
has  been  endorsed  by  many  economists  and 
policy-makers,  but  recent  research  conducted 
by  scholars  disputes  the  earlier  empirical  evi- 
dence.  *Many  question  the  mere  existence  of  a 
relationship  between  public  capital  and  pro- 
ductivity:  economics  not  being  a  science 
which  can  duplicate  laboratory  conditions, 
the  skeptics  allege  that  many  unknown  vari- 
ables  alter  analyses  which  examine  the  rea- 
sons  for  the  U.S.  declin.ing  productivity  trend 
(the  recent  gains  notwithstanding).  Others 
simply  state  that  though  a  relationship  may 
actually  exist  between  public  capital  and  pro- 
ductivity,  it  is  impossible  to  quantify  the 
magnitude  or  establish  a  precise  level  of  cor- 
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relation.  Implicitly,  the  critics,  represented  in  this  IW+c  Pof@l  Brief  by 
Douglas  Holtz-Eakin,  are  suggesting  that  the  inferences  derived  from  the 
econometric  results  of  the  relationships  previously  described  by  Aschauer 
are  not  plausible. 
In  his  first  State  of  the  Union  address  to  Congress,  President  Clinton 
announced  an  economic  program,  which  includes  a  fiscal  stimulus  package 
to  aid  the  recovery  in  the  near  term.  The  president’s  focus,  however,  is 
clearly  on  creating  meaningful  jobs  and  enhancing  the  level  of  U.S.  competi- 
tiveness  in  the  next  century.  The  long-term  investment  package  outlined  by 
the  president  supports  the  notion  that  public  investment  in  infrastructure, 
human  capital,  R&D,  and  other  growth  channels  will  have  significant  bene- 
fits  to  the  competitive  position  of  the  U.S.  economy. 
Dissenters  of  President  Clinton’s  plan  believe  that  although  public  infra- 
structure  investment  may  contribute  to  the  long-term  competitiveness  of 
this  country,  the  current  fiscal  climate  dictates  that  deficit  reduction  take 
precedence  over  any  program  which  may  expand  the  Federal  budget  deficit. 
In  essence,  these  observers  claim  that  deficit  reduction  and  public  invest- 
ment  are  mutually  exclusive  strategies. 
In  this  Pz&&  Po!jqy  Briefi  both  views  of  the  effects  of  public  infrastructure 
investment  on  the  economy  are  presented.  Our  purpose  at  the  Jerome  Levy 
Economics  Institute  is  to  present  balanced  and  academically  rigorous 
research  which  provokes  serious  thought  about  the  challenges  that  confront 
our  nation,  and  makes  a  lasting  contribution  to  the  public  policy  debate 
wh.ile  minimizing  the  damaging  effects  of  political  philosophy  and  ideology. 
Dimitri  I%.  Papadimitriou 
E.xecz.@~e  Director 
March  I993 
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hltroductiofl 
In  the  United  States,  there  is  an  increasing 
interest  in  policies  aimed  at  accelerating  the 
pace  of  productivity  growth.  This  interest  is 
primarily  due  to  two  sets  of  factors.  Looking 
backward  in  time,  the  long-term  rates  of 
growth  of  output  and  of  productivity  have 
fallen  below  that  of  the  “golden  agen  of  the 
19.50s  and  1960s.  Furthermore?  the  United 
States  productivity  growth  rate  has  been  sub- 
stantially  below  that  of  some  of  its  major 
economic  trading  partners  for  much  of  the 
post-World  War  II  period,  leading  to  the 
fear-rational  or  not-that  these  other  coun- 
tries  pose  a  threat  to  the  economic  leadership 
position  of  the  United  States.  Looking  for- 
ward  in  time,  the  labor-force  growth  rate  in 
the  United  States  is  expected  to  slip  below  the 
population  growth  rate  soon  after  the  turn  of 
the  century.  In  the  decades  ahead  the  number 
of  workers  relative  to  the  population  will 
decline,  and  the  maintenance  of  the  historical 
pace  of  improvements  in  living  standards  will 
require  the  typical  worker  to  become  steadily 
more  productive. 
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While  there  are  many  potential  mechanisms  to  raise  productivity  growth, 
most  turn  on  boosting  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation-either  tangible 
such  as  plant  and  equipment,  or  intangible  capital  such  as  that  generated  by 
research  and  development  expenditures.  Traditionahy,  the  role  of  fiscal  pal- 
icy  in  this  process  has  been  to  encourage  private  savings  and  private  invest- 
ment  through  tax  incentives  or  to  raise  national  savings  through  reductions 
in  the  government  budget  deficit. 
But  the  results  of  recent  empirical  research  offer  the  possibility  of  a  direct 
channel  by  which  fiscal  policy  can  affect  national  investment  and  national 
productivity  growth.  It  has  been  recognized  that  the  public  infrastructure- 
streets  and  highways,  mass  transit,  water  and  sewer  systems,  and  the  like- 
should-beconsidercd  as  a  factor  of  production  (along  with  labor  and  pri- 
vate  capital)  in  the  private  sector  production  process.  It  has  also  been 
recognized  that  public  infrastructure  spending,  as  a  share  of  total  output, 
reached  a  peak  in  the  latter  half  of  the  1960s.  The  results  of  some  of  the 
empirical  studies  (e.g.,  Aschauer  1  989aY  LMunnell  199Oa)  indicate  that  this 
reduction  in  the  pace  of  public  capital  accumulation  is  capable  of  explain- 
ing  a  very  substantial  portion  of  the  productivity  slowdown.  And  other 
studies  (e.g.,  Aschauer  1989c,  Ford  and  Poret  1991)  suggest  that  cross- 
country  differences  in  productivity  growth  might  also  be  partly  explained 
by  differences  in  levels  of  infrastructure  spending. 
These  empirical  studies,  linking  movements  in  private  sector  productivity  to 
trends  in  public  capital  investment,  raise  a  number  of  questions  which 
demand  further  discussion.  There  are  valid  concerns  about  the  statistical 
reliabihty  of  the  results.  At  least  four  questions  are  pertinent  here: 
1.  Is  the  strong  correlation  between  public  and  capital  productivity 
reflective  of  a  true  causal  role  for  public  investment  spending? 
2.  Is  the  estimated  magnitude  of  effect  too  large  to  be  plausible? 
3.  Is  the  public  capital  stock  merely  acting  as  a  proxy  for  other  omitted 
variables  such  as  population  shares,  exchange  rates,  or  oil  prices? 
4.  Finally,  even  if  it  were  accepted  that  a  strong  causal  relationship 
running  from  public  capital  to  productivity  exists,  for  public  policy 
purposes  it  would  still  be  necessary  to  answer  the  question:  Is  the 
public  capital  stock  currently  too  low? 
I  begin  by  briefly  discussing  trends  in  the  public  capital  stock  over  the  last 
three  decades,  and  then  assess  the  potential  impact  of  these  trends  on  pro- 
ductivity  growth.  Here  I  assume  that  the  public  capital  stock  does  act  as  an 
input  to  private  productionY  and  that  the  marginal  product  of  public  capital 
equals  that  of  the  private  capital  stock.  Next,  I  discuss  the  statistical  con- terns  which  I  just  noted,  paying  particular  attention  to  the  magnitude  of 
effect  or  to  the  output  elasticity  of  public  capital.  Finally?  I  discuss  the  ques- 
tion  of  the  optimality  of  the  public  capital  stock. 
Public  Capital  Trends  and  Potential  Impact  on  Productivity 
Table  1  shows  the  composition  and  behavior  of  the  nonmilitary  capital 
stock  of  the  federal  and  state  and  local  governments  over  the  past  three 
decades.  (These  public  capital  stocks  are  measured  net  of  depreciation  and 
in  constant  1990  dollars.)  The  vast  majority,  or  about  85%Y  of  the  nonmili- 
tary  public  capital  stock  is  owned  by  state  and  local  governments-nearly 
$1.9  trillion  of  the  total  of  almost  $2.2  trillion.  Of  course,  a  large  portion 
of  the  state  and  local  capital  stock  has  been  funded  by  grants  from  the  fed- 
eral  government.  Just  over  half  of  the  total  public  capital  stock  is  composed 
of  a  “core  infrastructure”  (e.g.,  streets  and  highways,  water  supply,  sewers, 
and  publicly  owned  electrical  and  gas  facilities)?  which  might  be  expected  to 
function  as  an  input  to  the  private  production  function  more  closely  than 
does  the  total  public  capital  stock.  Of  the  categories  of  the  core  infrastruc- 
ture,  streets  and  highways  represent  some  61%,  thus  being  the  largest  single 
category. 
Table  1 
Trends  in  PubIic  Capital  19604990 
Percent  of  GNP  $  (billions) 
1960  1.970  1980  1990  1990 
Total  46.1  48.9  4-5.3  40.6  2,180.4 
FtX!W-al  9.4  7.9  6.4  5.5  2?8.l 
Core  infrastructure  0.5  0.6  0.6  0._5  26.3 
Highways  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.3  17.2 
State  and  Local  36.7  41.0  38.9  35.1  1882.3 
Core  infrastructure  24.1  25.7  23.9  21.5  1143.0 
Highways  16.8  12.9  12.4  10.6  693.6 
Water  supply  2.3  2.3  2.1  2.1  109.6 
Sewers  3.0  3.0  3.5  3.5  184.1 
Source:  tJ,S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis 
The  total  public  capital  stock  rose  during  the  19SOs  and  l96Os,  peaking  in 
1948,  and  has  been  falling  thereafter.  The  public  capital  stock  equalled 
46.1%  of  GNP  in  1960  and  48.9%  GNP  in  1970,  but  by  1990  amounted 
to  less  than  41%  of  output.  As  shown  by  Table  1,  the  fall-off  in  the  ratio  of 
The  Jerome  ~.eyv  Economics  Institute  of  Bard  College  11 Public hzfrastmctm?  hmtrnmt:  A  Bridge to  Productivity Growth? 
12 
public  capital  stock  to  output  is  concentrated  in  the  streets  and  highways 
component,  with  water  and  sewer  systems  staying  even  with  output. 
Table  2 
Contribution  of  Public  Capital  to  Productivity 
Growth  1960-1989 
196049  1970-79  1980439 
[l]  Growth  in  public  capital  (%  per  year) 
Total  pubic  capital  4.31  2.00  1.38 
Core  infrastructure  3.9?  2.06  1.30 
.- 
[2]  Reduction  in  growth  in  public  capital 
(%  per  year,  relative  to  1960-69) 
Total  public  capital  2.31  2.93 
Core  infrastructure  1.93  2.69 
[3]  Growth  in  productky  (%  per  year)  ~ 
Labor  productivity  2.90  1.31  1.28 
Total  factor  productivity  1.82  0.60  0.87 
-.._ 
-~  [4]  Reduction  in  growth  in  productivity 
( YO  per  year,  relative  to  1960-69) 
Labor  productivity  159  1.62 
Total  factor  productivity  1.22  0.9s 
[S]  Contribution  of  pubhi  capital  to 
productivity  growha  (%  per  year) 
Total  public  capital  0.26  0.09  0.05 
Core  infrastructure  0.13  0.0.5  0.02 
[6]  Reduction  iu  contribution  of  public 
capital  to  productivity  growth  (%  per  year) 
Total  public  capital  0.17  0.21 
Core  infrastructure  0.08  0.11 
[7]  Producti&  growth  slowdown  e&lained 
by  public  capital  (%) 
Labor  productivity 
Total  public  capital  10.69  13.93 
Core  infrastructure  5.03  656 
Total  factor  productivity 
Total  public  capital  12.96  22.11. 
Core  infrastructure  6.79  Il.58 
a  Measured  as  rhe  product  of  the  elasticity  of  output  with  respect  to  public  capital  (total  and  core 
infrastructure,  respectively),  ~KG, and  the  growth  rate  of  public  capital.  In  the  calculations,  the 
return  ti  public  caphal  is  assumed  to  equal  that  of  private  capital,  ranging  from  12.73%  in  the 
period  from  1960  to  1969  to  8.11%  in  the  period  from  19M) to  1989. 
Table  2  details  some  standard  growth  accounting  computations  linking 
changes  in  investment  in  total  public  capital  and  core  infrastructure  capital 
to  labor  and  total  factor  productivity  growth.  Line  (1)  of  Table  2  shows 
that  the  growth  rate  of  the  total  public  capital  stock  was  4.31%  per  year  in 
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the  196Os,  2%  in  the  1970~~  and  1.38Oh  in  the  1980s.  The  core  infrastruc- 
ture  displays  similar  growth  rates.  Line  (2)  shows  the  reduction  in  growth 
rates  in  public  capital  for  the  1970s  and  1980s  relative  to  the  high  growth 
rate  of  the  1960s.  For  the  1970~~  the  fall-off  in  growth  of  both  the  total  and 
infrastructure  capital  stocks  was  in  the  range  of  2  percentage  points:  for  the 
l98Os,  the  fall-off  was  increased  to  between  2.67  and  3  percentage  points. 
Line  (3)  shows  the  growth  rates  of  labor  productivity  and  total  factor  pro- 
ductivity,  and  line  (4)  shows  the  percentage  point  reduction  in  productivity 
growth.  Relative  to  the  196Os,  labor  productivity  growth  fell  by  over  1.5 
percentage  points3  while  total  factor  productivity  growth  declined  by 
around  1  percentage  point.  Most  of  the  decline  in  labor  productivity 
growth7  then,  is  the  result  of  a  decline  in  multifactor  productivity  growth. 
While  a  slower  pace  of  private  capital  accumulation  relative  to  the  labor 
force  has  been  an  important  factor,  it  explains  less  than  half  of  the  slow- 
down  in  labor  productivity  growth. 
One  potential  factor  explaining  a  portion  of  the  decline  in  total  factor  pro- 
ductivity  growth  and,  thereby,  labor  productivity  growth  is  the  reduced  rate 
of  public  capital  accumulation.  [See  Appendix  A  for  further  discussion  of 
this  issue.] 
The  basic  conclusion  of  TabIe  2  is  that  a  non-negligible  portion,  perhaps 
around  lo%7  of  the  productivity  slump  can  be  explained  by  the  lower  rate 
of  public  capital  accumulation  during  the  1970s  and  198Os-evefi  without 
making  use  of  what  some  would  term  “implausibly  highm  elasticity  esti- 
mates  from  the  tiflawcd”  aggregate  studies. 
The  calculations  in  Table  2  show  the  potential  &rect  contribution  of  public 
investment  to  labor  productivity  growth.  But  provided  that  public  capital  is 
complementary  to  private  capital,  infrastructure  investment  may  z?z&rec~Zy 
contribute  to  labor  productivity  growth.  An  increase  in  public  capital  accu- 
mulation  will  raise  the  marginal  product  of  private  capital  and,  thereby, 
provide  the  incentive  for  a  higher  rate  of  private  investment.  The  quicker 
pace  of  private  capital  accumulation  will  then  contribute  to  an  enhanced 
rate  of  labor  productivity  growth. 
Table  3  shows  how  the  trends  in  public  capital  accumulation  may  con- 
tribute  to  the  movements  in  labor  productivity  in  this  indirect  manner.  [See 
Appendix  B  for  a  statistical  presentation  of  this  re1ationship.J 
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Table  3 
Contribution  of  Public  Capital  to  Growth  in 
Private  Capital  zml  in  Labor  Procktivii 
1970-79  1980-89 
[ 1 ]  Reduction  in  growth  of  private  capital 
stock(%  per  year,  relative  to  1960-69) 
[2J  Reduction  in  growth  of  private  capital 
stock  explained  by  public  capitala 
(%  per  year...) 
]3]  Indirect  contribution  of  pubhc  capital 
to  reduction  in  labor  productivity 
growthb  (%  per  year...) 
[4]  Direct  contribution  of  public  capital  to 
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%aiculated  from  an  investment  model  whew  [i)  the  growth  rate  of  the  private  capital  stock 
depends  positively  on  lagged  growth  of  private  capital,  positively  on  the  rate  of  return  to  private 
capital,  positively  on  the  capacity  utilization  rate  in  manufacturing,  and  negatively  on  the  public 
investment  rate,  and  (ii)  the  rate  of  return  to  private  capital  depends  positively  on  time,  nega- 
tivelv  on  the  private  capital-to-labor  ratio,  positively  on  the public  capital  stock.  and  positively 
on  the  capacity  utilization  rate  in  manufacturing.  The  model  assumes  that  ~I,w  mqgizu~  product 
ofpz&k  cupital  eqt.&  thut  ofpri~tite  cupitul  and  that,  given  the  rate  of  return  to  private  capital. 
art  increase  in  public  investment  induces  un  equal  r-eductit-m  in  priwre  investment.  See  the  test  for 
further  detail. 
bleasured  as  the  product  of  the  elasticity  of  output  with  respect  to  private  capital,  qx,  and  the 
reduction  in  growth  in  the  private  capital  stock  explained  by  the  reduction  in growth  of  the  pub- 
lic  capital  stock. 
%om  Table  2,  line  (7). 
Meanwhile,  the  rate  of  return  to  private  capital-which  feeds  into  the 
investment  equation-depends: 
A.  positively  on  time  (proxying  for  technological  progress) 
IS. negatively  on  the  private  capital-labor  ratio  (due  to  a  diminishing 
marginal  product  of  private  capital) 
C.  positively  on  the  public  capital  stock,  and 
D.  positively  on  capacity  utilization  (capturing  cyclical  effects). 
Consistent  with  previous  set  calculations,  the  model’s  parameters  are  set 
such  that  the  marginal  product  of  public  capital  equals  that  of  the  private Public  Capital  and  Economic  Growth 
capital.  The  model  also  assumes  that  given  the  rate  of  return  to  private  cap- 
ital,  a  one-dollar  increase  in  public  investment  induces  a  one-dollar  reduc- 
tion  in  private  investment.  Only  over  time,  as  the  rate  of  return  to  private 
capital  rises  with  increase  in  public  capital  stock?  does  a  higher  rate  of  pub- 
lic  capital  investment  bring  forth  an  increase  in  national  (public  plus  pri- 
vate)  investment.  [See  Appendix  C  for  a  statistical  discussion.] 
Reverse  Causation? 
One  reason  for  guarded  optimism  about  the  aggregate  time  series  result  is 
the  problem  of  Y~XYYS~  cuusation.  Certainly,  a  logical  case  can  be  made  that 
public  investment  may  well  be  responding  to  changes  in  private  economy 
instead  of  initiating  them.  For  instance,  one  could  argue  that  slower  growth 
in  productivity,  per  capita  income,  and  tax  revenue  induced  the  government 
at  all  levels  to  reduce  spending  on  public  capital  projects.  Pushed  to  its  logi- 
cal  extreme,  this  suggests  that  the  fall-off  in  public  investment  in  the  1970s 
and  1980s  was  a  result,  not  a  cause,  of  the  slump  in  productivity  during  the 
same  period.  Stated  differently,  it  could  be  said  that  the  correlation  between 
public  capital  and  productivity  is  reflective  of  a  demand-side  rather  than  a 
supply-side  causal  relationship. 
Of  course,  there  is  nothing  special  about  public  capital  in  terms  of  the  pos- 
sibility  of  reverse  causation;  similar  concern  has  been  raised  with,respect  to 
private  capital.  This  hasn’t  stopped  others  from  making  use  of  the  correla- 
tion  for  the  purpose  of  making  policy  recommendations.  For  example,  in 
their  book  Prodzxtizhy  and  American  Leadership,  William  Baumol?  Sue 
Anne  Batey  Blackman,  and  Edward  Wolff  caution  that  the  well-known 
cross-country  relationship  between  growth  in  the  private  capital  stock  and 
output  and  productivity  can  run  both  ways.  Nevertheless,  in  theirpolicy 
conclusions,  the  authors  assert  that  Git  seems  farfetched  to  discount  alto- 
gether  the  association  so  tight  as  that  between  investment  and  economic 
growth..  .  ”  and  they  subsequently  estimate  how  it  would  be  possible  to 
achieve  a  particular  productivity  target-parity  with  major  international 
competitors  to  the  United  States  through  the  year  2020-by  boosting  the 
rate  of  growth  of  the  private  capital  stock.  Similarly,  it  would  seem  far- 
fetched  to  discount,  at  least  completely,  the  efficacy  of  lifting  labor  produc- 
tivity  growth  through  public  capital  accumulation. 
Further,  at  a  heuristic  level,  the  demand-side  reverse  causation  argument 
has  its  own  problems.  There  are  some  economists  who  argue  that  in  the 
United  States  the  productivity  growth  slowdown  began  as  early  as  1965. 
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There  are  even  some  (e.g.,  Darby  1984)  who  take  the  position  that  the  pro- 
ductivity  slowdown  is  a  result  of  a  mismeasurement  of  factor  inputs  or  of 
output.  But  these  economists  represent  a  distinct  minority  in  the  profession. 
Indeed,  it  seems  safe  to  say  that  the  consensus  view  of  the  economic  profes- 
sion  is  that  the  productivity  growth  slowdown  is  real  and  that  it  began  in 
&e  e&y  1970s.  But  as  seen  from  Figure  1,  public  nonmilitary  investment 
spending,  relative  to  gross  national  product,  reached  a  peak  in  the  period 
bemeerz  1965  and  2 968.  So  while  it  is  possible,  perhaps  even  likely,  that  in 
the  latter  part  of  the  1970s  and  in  the  1980s  slow  productivity  growth 
hampered  investments  in  public  capital,  it  is  unlikely  that  sluggish  produc- 
tivity  growth  represented  the  initiaf  cause  of  decline  in  public  investment 
expenditure. 
Figure  1 
Public  Investment  Trends 
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At  a  more  formal  level,  there  are  a  number  of  reasons  to  believe  that  the 
correlation  between  public  capital  and  productivity  is  indicative  of  a  true 
causal  role  for  public  investment.  There  is  evidence  that  those  functional 
categories  of  public  capital  which  one  would  expect,  on  an  a  priori  basis,  to 
benefit  the  private  economy  the  most-specifically,  a  core  infrastructure  of 
transportation  facilities  and  of  water  and  sewer  systems--turns  out  to  be 
the  most  important  in  the  aggregate  production  functions.  [See  Appendix  D 
for  a  technical  discussion  of  these  issues.] 
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Hence9  the  question  arises:  if  these  correlations  are  indicative  of  a  reverse 
causation,  why  is  it  the  case  that  the  elasticity  estimates  are  strongly  posi- 
tive  for  core  infrastructure  categories  but  negligible  or  even  negative  for 
other  public  capital?  Specifically,  why  should  the  productivity  slowdown 
have  caused  a  reduction  in  capital  investments  in  highways,  water  supply, 
and  sewer  systems  but  not  in  other  capital  such  as  office  buildings,  hospi- 
tals?  and  schools?  Seemingly?  this  is  an  odd  set  of  demand  elasticities.  [See 
Appendix  E  for  a  review  of  other  relevant  studies  of  reverse  causation.] 
Another  strategy  to  minimize  the  likelihood  of  the  estimated  elasticities 
merely  picking  up  a  demand-side  linkage  between  public  capital  and  pro- 
ductivity  would  be  to  estimate  cost  functions  rather  than  production  func- 
tions.  The  purpose  would  be  to  obtain  an  estimate  of  the  shadow  vale  of 
public  capital,  a  measure  of  the  reduction  in  cost  of  production  resulting 
from  a  given  increase  in  public  capital.  The  point  I  want  to  make  is  that  the 
estimate  of  the  shadow  value  of  public  capital  will  not  directly  involve  any 
relationship  between  output  and  the  public  capital  stock;  instead,  output  is 
allowed  to  have  a  separate,  distinct  influence  on  costs  of  production.  Here, 
the  finding  of  a  significant  shadow  value  of  public  capital  in  the  private  sec- 
tor  would  seem  to  undermine  the  demand-side  argument.  Specifically,  if  we 
are  to  believe  that  the  correlation  between  public  capital  and  private  output 
merely  evidences  a  demand-side  budgetary  link,  then  why  is  it  that,  when 
we  hold  fixed  the  level  of  output,  an  increase  in  the  public  capital  stock 
reduces  production  costs? 
[See  Appendix  F  for 
costs  relationship.] 
technical  presentation  of  the  public  capital-production 
Too  Large  an  Impact? 
Even  if  one  accepts,  on  theoretical  and  empirical  grounds,  that  public  infra- 
structure  partly  determines  private  sector  output,  productivity,  and  costs  of 
production,  the  concern  remains  that  the  estimated  impact  is  too  large.  For 
example,  the  results  in  Aschauer  (1989a)  and  Munnell(199Oa)  imply  that  a 
1.0%  increase  in  the  public  capital  stock  will  increase  private  sector  output 
by  as  much  as  or  more  than  0.33%-an  amount  which  is  seen  by  a  number 
of  well-respected  economists  as  being  “implausibleW  (Aaron  1990),  “grossly 
inflated”  (Schultze  1990),  or  which  “strains  credulity”  (LMontgomery 
1990). 
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Of  course,  lacking  alternative  evidence  on  the  impact  of  public  capital  on 
productivity  and  costs,  it  is  difficult  to  say  what  is  plausible  or  implausible. 
Indeed,  those  who  argue  that  the  estimated  effect  of  public  infrastructure  is 
too  large  rarely,  if  ever,  provide  direct  evidence  to  sbpport  their  position. 
Those  who  do  present  such  evidence  refer  to  the  results  of  cost-benefit  stud- 
ies  which  imply  much  lower  average  returns  to  public  capital  investments. 
But  these  low  returns  could  just  as  conceivably  be  due  to  deficiencies  in 
cost-benefit  methods  which  tend  to  understate  the  true  return  to  public  cap- 
ital  accumulation.  I  have  detailed  these  potential  defects  elsewhere.  Among 
other  factors,  they  involve  the  use  of  inappropriately  h.igh  discount  rates 
and  the  inherent  difficulties  in  capturing  general  equilibrium  effects  in  con- 
ventional  partial  equilibrium  cost-benefit  frameworks. 
Others  attempt  to  undermine  the  credibility  of  the  aggregate  estimates  by 
arguing  that  whiIe  many  empirical  studies  “have  found  statistical  evidence 
that  public  capital  influences  private  output?”  the  magnitude  of  public  capi- 
tal’s  impact  is  “quite  small”  (I3oz.u Fedem!  Spending  for  ~rzf~astmct~re  and 
0th~  PMbiic  hmtments  Affects  the  Economy,  1991).  However7  what 
these  analysts  usually  fail  to  recognize,  or  at  least  to  communicateY  is  that 
adjustments  often  must  be  made  to  perform  a  proper  comparison.  After 
such  adjustments  are  made,  the  various  estimates  turn  out  to  be  much 
closer  in  magnitude  than  a  cursory  view  may  suggest. 
Three  sorts  of  adjustment  are  necessary.  First,  it  is  not  typically  the  case 
that  the  definition  of  the  public  capital  stocks  is  the  same  across  studies.  In 
some  cases,  the  public  capital  stock  is  limited  to  highways  (Garcia-Mila  and 
McGuire  1990),  while  in  others  it  is  more  inclusive-perhaps  a  core  infra- 
structure  of  highways  but  also  mass  transit3  airports,  and  water  and  sewer 
systems  (Aschauer  19g9a).  It  is  inappropriate  to  follow  the  lead  of 
Jorgenson  (1991)  and  compare  elasticities  of  different  types  of  public  capi- 
tal.  If,  instead,  one  were  to  correctly  compare,  say,  the  output  elasticity  of 
highway  capital  alone,  one  finds  much  closer  estimates;  for  example, 
Garcia-Mila  and  McGuire  (1990)  estimate  the  highway  elasticity  to  equal 
0.04  while  Munnell  (199Ob)  estimates  it  to  equal  0.06. 
Second9  it  is  necessary  to  adjust  for  differences  in  the  geographic  scope  of 
the  studies.  The  estimates  of  the  output  elasticities  of  public  capital  arising 
from  production  function  studies  using  a  similar  definition  of  public  capital 
show  a  fairly  systematic  relationship  with  the  level  of  government.  In  par- 
ticular,  the  estimates  tend  to  be  larger  at  the  federal  level  than  at  the  state 
level,  and  larger  at  the  state  level  than  the  municipal  level.  This  is  to  be 
expected  since9  to  a  certain  extent,  the  benefits  of  infrastructure  are  likely  to 
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spill  over  jurisdictional  lines.  Munnell  (1991)  makes  this  point  by  stating 
that  a  because  of  leakages,  one  cannot  capture  all  the  payoff  to  an  infra- 
structure  investment  by  looking  at  a  small  geographic  area.” 
Finally,  while  some  studies  involve  the  total  private  economy,  others,  such 
as  Morrison  and  Schwartz  (1991),  involve  only  the  manufacturing  sector, 
and  still  others,  such  as  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas  (1991),  involve  only  a  sub- 
set  of  manufacturing  industries.  As  the  benefits  of  infrastructure  can  be 
expected  to  fall  not  just  on  manufacturing  but  across  all  industries,  it  is  nec- 
essary  to  gross  up  the  marginal  benefits  of  public  capital  found  in  manufac- 
turing  in  some  fashion.  For  example?  assuming  that  (on  average)  the  rates 
of  return  to  public  capital  in  other  sectors  of  the  economy  are  the  same  as 
in  the  manufacturing  sector,  it  would  be  appropriate  to  multiply  the  esti- 
mated  returns  in  manufacturing  by  the  ratio  of  total  private  business  output 
to  manufacturing  output  to  compare  the  manufacturing  estimate  with  the 
national  estimates.  As  of  1991,  manufacturing  represented  approximately 
20%  of  private  output  so  that,  to  a  first  approximation,  this  adjustment 
would  require  multiplication  of  the  return  to  public  capital  in  manufactur- 
ing  by  a  factor  of  five.  Thus,  upon  appropriate  adjustment,  rather  small 
effects  may,  in  fact,  represent  quite  high  aggregate  returns. 
Omitted  Variables? 
Another  concern  is  that  the  correlation  between  public  capital  and  produc- 
tivity  is  actually  due  to  public  capital  proxying  for  other  variables.  JEcono- 
mists  at  the  Congressional  Budget  Office  argue  that  one  such  data  series 
would  be  a  demographic  variable  such  as  the  percentage  of  the  population 
between  five  and  fifteen  years  of  age.  As  Figure  2  indicates,  this  population 
variable,  too,  “f  o  11  ows  the  same  smooth  path  as  the  public  capital  stocks, 
rising  through  1968  and  falling  thereafter.”  Further,  these  economists  assert 
that  when  this  series  is  used  in  p/ace  of-not  in  addition  to-the  public  cap- 
ital  stock?  “it  appears  to  ‘explain’  private  output  in  as  statistically  signifi- 
cant  a  fashion  as  does  public  capital.”  Since  there  is  no  reason  to  expect 
that  the  relationship  reflects  anything  more  than  coincidence,  it  follows  that 
“the  association  between  private  output  and  stocks  of  public  capital  may 
also  be  coincidental.”  Aaron  (1990)  makes  use  of  a  different  data  series- 
the  yen/dollar  exchange  rate-  to  make  essentially  the  same  point. 
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Figure  2 
Relationship  Between  Private  Output  and  Young  Pempte 
as  a  Pementage  of  the  Total  Population,  1951-1985 
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Source:  Congressional  Budget  Office  using  data  from  the  Bureau  of  J.Aor  Statistics;  and 
Ecr~oMc  RQW  of the President  (February  1  ??  1) 
Now  Private  output  is  measured  by a  three-year  moving  average  of  private  business  output  per 
hour  worked  (adjusted  for  time  trends).  Young  people  are  those  between  ages  S  and  1S  years. 
The  method  of  argument  employed  by  these  researchers  is  clearly  anti-sci- 
entific.  It  is  my  understanding  that  good  empirical  science  proceeds  by  con- 
structing  a  good  theoretical  model  with  refutable  hypotheses-such  as  that 
the  public  capital  stock  positively  influences  private  sector  productivity- 
and  then  testing  the  theory  by  confronting  the  hypothesis  with  the  available 
data.  The  method  used  by  these  researchers,  on  the  other  hand,  is  to  search 
for  data  series  which  will  attenuate  the  relationship  between  pubIic  capital 
and  output  without  providing  any  theoretical  justification  for  the  relevance 
of  such  variables.  Indeed,  the  lack  of  theoretical  motivation  is  viewed  as 
something  of  a  virtue.  Yet,  without  any  theoretical  rationale,  C.WZ~  data 
series  becomes  admissible,  and  the  ability  of  such  researchers  to  find  one  or 
more  data  series  to  accomplish  their  goal  will  be  constrained  only  by  the 
extent  of  their  desire  to  debunk  a  particular  theory. 
That  having  been  said,  it  is  also  true  that  these  researchers  overstate  their 
respective  cases.  It  is  true  that  various  demographic  variables  -by  them- 
selves-perform  in  a  manner  similar  to  public  capital  in  the  statistical  mod- 
els.  But  what  is  also  true  is  that  when  both  the  public  capital  and  the  demo- Public  &pita2  and  Ecorzomic  G~owtb 
graphic  series  are  included  in  the  models,  the  public  capital  series  inevitably 
dominates;  indeed,  the  demographic  variables  have  no  additional  statisti- 
cally  significant  explanatory  power  for  output  once  public  capital  is 
included.  It  is  also  true  that  the  yen/dollar  exchange  rate  seems  to  “cause” 
productivity.  But  in  order  to  eliminate  the  importance  of  the  public  capital 
stock  for  productivity,  Aaron  finds  it  necessary  to  not  only  include  the 
yen/dollar  exchange  rate  but  &o  to  convert  to  growth  rates  (thereby 
switching  the  focus  from  the  long  run  to  the  short  run)  and  to  add  dummy 
variables  for  1966  and  for  1974.  It  is  hardly  surprising  that  with  this  much 
effort  it  is  possible  to  overturn  a  particular  empirical  result. 
Other  researchers  have  taken  a  better  approach.  Tatom  (1991)  argues  that 
movements  in  the  price  of  energy  should  be  expected  to  have  had  an  impor- 
tant  impact  on  productivity  over  the  post-world  War  11  period:  thus,  he 
adds  the  real  price  of  oil  as  an  additional  explanatory  variable  in  the  aggre- 
gate  productivity  model.  Tatom  presents  empirical  results  which  seem  to 
indicate  that  the  addition  of  the  oil  price  variable  completely  eliminates  the 
importance  of  public  capital  in  the  statistical  model. 
Yet  a  closer,  technical  look  at  Tatom’s  methodology  reveals  a  contradiction 
within  his  theoretical  model.  The  basic  problem  is  that  he  uses  a  value 
added  measure  for  his  output  variable,  so  that  energy  should  not  directly 
influence  productivity.  While  there  are  other,  indirect  reasons  why  changes 
in  energy  prices  might  impact  on  productivity-such  as  induced  capital 
obsolescence-he  disallows  those  reasons  by  the  constrained  manner  in 
which  he  introduces  energy  into  his  empirical  model.  If  one  recognizes  the 
contradiction  and  relaxes  the  relative  constraint,  one  finds  that  the  public 
capital  stock  still  carries  important  explanatory  power  for  productivity. 
Finally,  most  researchers  who  bring  up  the  question  of  omitted  variables 
seem  to  believe  that  the  inclusion  of  other  variables  will  work  to  eliminate 
the  importance  of  public  capital.  Yet  this  is  not  always  the  case.  Hulten  and 
Schwab  (1991  b]  use  state-level  data  for  manufacturing  and  find  little  role 
for  growth  in  the  public  capital  stock  in  determining  growth  in  total  factor 
productivity.  Yet  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas  (1991)  find  that  when  the  capacity 
utilization  rate  and  growth  in  the  stock  of  research  and  development  capital 
are  added  into  the  empirical  model,  the  elasticity  of  output  with  respect  to 
public  capital  is  estimated  at  0.29  and  is  statistically  significant.  The  addi- 
tion  of  the  capacity  utilization  rate  is  important  since  it  captures  move- 
ments  in  productivity  over  the  business  cycle.  Moreover,  the  growth  in  the 
stock  of  research  and  development  spending  has  been  shown  to  be  an 
important  determinant  of  productivity  growth  in  a  large  number  of  studies. 
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An  Optimal Lewel  of  Public Capital? 
Let’s  suppose  that  you’re  convinced  of  a  strong  causal  relationship  between 
pubhc  capital  investment  and  productivity  and  output.  From  a  policy  per- 
spective,  it  would  still  be  necessary  to  go  further  and  answer  the  question: 
Is  the  public  capital  stock  at  a  level  which  maximizes  private  sector  produc- 
tivity?  The  time  series  results  suggest  that,  at  the  aggregate  level,  there  is 
under-provision  of  public  capital,  with  the  implied  rate  of  return  to  public 
capital  in  excess  of  that  to  private  capital.  Yet,  as  discussed  above?  many 
would  find  the  results  in  these  studies  unreliable.  Hence,  it  is  prudent  to 
consider  the  results  of  other  studies  as  well. 
*Bunnell  estimates  an  output  elasticity  of  public  capital  of  0.15,  while  the 
output  elasticity  of  private  capital  is  0.31;  as  the  private  capital  stock  is 
about  twice  the  size  of  the  state  and  local  public  capital  stock,  these  results 
imply  roughly  equal  returns  to  both  types  of  capital?  and  it  would  appear 
that  there  is  a  nearly  optimal  level  of  public  capital  provision.  Yet  Munnell 
stresses  that  the  existence  of  external  effects-in  particular,  that  the  total 
benefits  of  a  state  highway  will  not  be  captured  by  that  state’s  economy  but 
will  also  spill  over  on  adjacent  and  other  states-“suggests  that  the  United 
States  has  underinvested  in  public  capital.-  Further  research  is  called  for  to 
gauge  the  full  extent  of  this  type  of  spillover  effect  and  see  if  it  is  large 
enough  to  explain  a  substantive  portion  of  the  difference  between  the  state- 
level  results  and  the  national-level  results. 
[See  Appendix  G  for  a  technical  discussion  of  the  relationship  between  pub- 
lic  capital  and  manufacturing.] 
There  are  grounds  for  believing  that  the  rate  of  return  on  public  capital 
may  be  as  high  or  higher  in  other  industries  than  it  has  been  found  to  be  in 
manufacturing.  For  example,  in  a  study  of  the  trucking  industry,  Keeler  and 
Ying  (1988)  estimate  that  as  much  as  three-quarters  of  the  Federal  Aid 
highway  investments  during  the  19.50s  and  1960s  can  be  rationalized  o?z 
the  basis  of  reductions  in  tmcking  costs  alone. 
Conrad  and  Seitz  (1992)  find  that  the  rate  of  return  to  infrastructure  is 
roughly  equal  in  the  manufacturing  and  trade  and  transport  industries 
(0.056  and  O.O5S,  respectively)  and,  while  somewhat  lower,  is  still  substan- 
tial  in  the  construction  industry  as  well  (at  0.031). 
Putting  these  results  together,  it  appears  that  the  aggregate  rate  of  return  to 
infrastructure  capital-once  one  adjusts  for  the  inclusiveness  of  the  public l’&iic  Capital  and  Economic  Gmutb 
capital  stock,  for  geographic  spillover  effects,  and  for  the  industry  cover- 
age  -is  at  least  as  high  as  that  of  private  capital.  In  my  opinion,  the  returns 
to  public  capital  arc  probably  higher  than  that. 
Finally,  I  want  to  address  the  commonly  accepted  notion  that  in  recent 
decades  the  United  States  has  been  consuming  too  much  and  saving  too  lit- 
tle.  In  terms  of  the  neoclassical  growth  model,  the  capital  stock  is  well 
below  the  Golden  Rule  level,  with  the  net  marginal  product  of  private  capi- 
tal  in  excess  of  the  average  growth  rate  of  real  output.  Back-of-the-envelope 
calculations  yield  an  estimate  of  the  net  marginal  product  capital  of  about 
8%,  compared  to  an  average  economic  growth  rate  of  around  2.53%  per 
year. 
In  this  setting,  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  returns  to  public  capital  to  be 
greater  than-or  even  equal  to-those  of  private  capital  in  order  to  ratio- 
nalize  increased  public  investment.  As  long  as  the  returns  to  infrastructure 
investment  exceed  the  growth  rate  of  the  economy,  an  increase  in  public 
investment-financed  through  a  reduction  in  either  public  or  private  con- 
sumption-  will  favorably  tilt  the  national  consumption  profile  toward  the 
future.  So,  if  it  is  true  that  the  United  States  doesn’t  save  and  invest  enough, 
then  one  way  to  partly  overcome  this  deficiency  is  through  appropriate 
investments  in  our  infrastructure.  A  reorientation  of  public  spending  away 
from  consumption  toward  investment  is  just  as  advisable  as  a  reduction  in 
the  budget  deficit  to  raise  living  standards  in  the  next  century. 
Appendix  A 
Line  (5)  of  Table  2  calculates  the  potential  contribution  of  public  capital  to 
productivity  growth.  It  is  assumed  that  the  marginal  product  of  public  capi- 
tal  is  equal  to  that  of  private  capital.  Although  some  (maybe  Paul  Craig 
Roberts)  would  argue  that  this  assumption  overstates  the  returns  to  total 
public  capital-and  perhaps  even  to  infrastructure  capital-this  represents  a 
low  rate  of  return  when  compared  to  some  empirical  results  in  the  area.  For 
now,  my  intent  is  only  to  provide  a  reasonable  benchmark  calculation  and 
bypass  the  controversy  about  the  larger  aggregate  elasticity  estimates.  As 
line  (S)  of  TabIe  2  h  s  ows,  by  this  type  of  calculation  the  contribution  of  the 
total  public  capital  stock  was  just  over  0.25%  per  year  during  the  196Os, 
just  under  0.10%  during  the  197Os,  and  onIy  &OS%  during  the  1980s.  The 
contribution  of  growth  in  the  core  infrastructure  was  over  0.10%  per  year 
during  the  196Os,  0.05%  during  the  197Os,  and  negligible  during  the 
1980s.  Line  (6)  of  Table  2  translates  these  results  into  percentage-point 
7%~  J~YOVW  Levy  Economics  institute  of  Bard  College  23 Public  lnfiastructwe  Investment:  A  Bridge  to  Productivity  C?-owth? 
reductions  in  public  capital’s  contribution  during  the  1970s  and  1980s  rela- 
tive  to  the  1960s.  The  contribution  of  total  public  capital  stock  fell  by 
around  0.20%,  while  that  of  core  infrastructure  declined  by  about  0.10%: 
in  both  cases,  there  was  a  somewhat  larger  decline  during  the  1980s  than  in 
the  1970s. 
Line  (7)  of  Table  2  shows  that  depending  on  the  definition  of  productivity 
and  public  capita&  between  5%  and  22%  of  the  productivity  decline  can  be 
explained  by  the  slowdown  in  public  capital  accumulation.  Total  public 
capital  tends  to  explain  more  of  the  slowdown  because  of  the  larger  implied 
output  elasticity  coupled  with  similar  rates  of  growth  of  total  and  infra- 
structure  capital.  And  more  of  total  factor  productivity  is  explained 
because?  in  percentage-point  terms,  the  fall-off  in  labor  productivity  growth 
exceeded  that  of  total  factor  productivity  growth. 
Appendix  B 
Line  (I)  of  Table  3  shows  the  percentage-point  reduction  in  the  growth  rate 
of  the  private  capital  stock  of  equipment  and  non-residential  structures  of 
over  0.50%  per  year  in  the  1970s  and  over  1.25%  per  year  during  the 
198Os-both  relative  to  the  1960s.  Line  (2)  of  Table  3  shows  that  for  both 
decades,  about  0.40-050%  per  year  of  this  reduction  can  be  explained  by 
the  slowdown  in  public  capital  accumulation.  These  amounts  are  calculated 
from  a  model  which  assumes  that  the  growth  rate  of  private  capital  stock 
depends: 
A.  positively  on  the  rate  of  return  to  private  capital  and  on  the  capacity 
utilization  rate  in  manufacturing  (as  in  Feldstein  1982),  and 
B.  holding  fixed  the  return  to  private  capital,  negatively  on  the  public 
investment  rate. 
Appendix  C 
Line  (3)  of  Table  3  calculates  the  indirect  contribution  of  the  reduction  in 
public  investment  to  the  slowdown  in  labor  productivity  growth.  This  is  the 
reduction  in  the  growth  rate  of  private  capital  of  line  (2)  of  Table  3  multi- 
plied  by  the  output  elasticity  of  private  capital  of  between  0.30  and  0.35. 
This  yields  an  indirect  contribution  of  public  capital  of  just  under  0.17% 
per  year  for  both  the  1970s  and  the  1980s.  The  direct  contributions  of 
nearly  0.20%  in  line  (4)  of  Table  3  are  taken  from  Table  2;  when  added 
together,  the  direct  and  indirect  contributions  are  capable  of  explaining 
24  Public  Policy  Brief Public  Capital  and  Economic  Growth 
about  0.33%  of  the  drop  in  productivity  growth.  By  line  (6)  of  Table  3, 
about  20%  of  the  labor  productivity  slowdown  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  can 
thus  be  explained  by  the  direct  and  indirect  contribution  of  the  reduction  in 
growth  in  the  total  public  capital  stock. 
By  these  calculations,  then,  the  potential  role  of  public  capital  in  the  pro- 
ductivity  slowdown  is  certainly  non-negligible.  But  if  the  results  of  the 
aggregate  time  series  studies  are  to  be  believed,  public  capital  may  play  an 
even  larger  role  in  the  productivity  slowdown.  For  instance,  in  my  own 
work  the  output  elasticity  of  public  capital  is  as  high  as  0.39,  so  that  the 
direct  contribution  of  public  capital  could  be  some  six  times  larger  than 
that  of  Table  2  and  explain  as  much  as  60%  of  the  slowdown  in  productiv- 
ity  growth.  As  stated  before,  though,  there  are  a  number  of  valid  statistical 
concerns  which  need  to  be  addressed. 
Appendix  D 
For  instance,  Munnell  (199Ob)  employs  the  data  for  the  forty-eight  contigu- 
ous  states  over  the  period  1970  to  1986  and  estimates  separate  output  elas- 
ticities  for  highways,  water  and  sewer  systems,  and  other  public  capital 
such  as  office  buildings,  hospitals,  and  schools.  Table  4  presents  her  results. 
For  the  Cobb-Douglas  production  function,  the  output  elasticity  of  high- 
ways  equals  0.06,  of  water  and  sewer  systems  0.12,  and  other  public  capital 
0.01.  For  the  translog  production  function,  the  direct  output  elasticity  of 
highways  equals  0.04,  of  water  and  sewers  0.15,  and  of  other  capital  a  neg- 
ative  0.02.  In  a  comment  on  Munnell’s  paper,  Eisner  (1991)  provides  sup- 
porting  evidence  along  hoth  the  time  series  and  cross-sectional  dimensions. 
His  direct  elasticity  estimates  can  he  seen  to  range  between  0.06  and  O.Og 
for  highways,  between  0.08  and  0.11  for  water  and  sewers,  and  between  a 
statistically  insignificant  0.01  and  a  negative  0.12  for  other  capital. 
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Table  4 
Disaggregated  Public  Capital  and  Output 
Munneil  Eisncr 
Time  Series  Cross  Section 
CD  T  CD  T  CD  T 
Highways  0.06  0.04  0.08  0.08  0.04  0.06 
(3.8)  (2.7)  (2.S}  (2.4)  (3.9)  (3.8) 
Warer  and  Sewers  0.12  0.1s  0.08  -0.07  0.12  0.11 
(9.6)  (10.9)  (S.2)  (4.8)  (9.3)  (10.7) 
Other  -  0.01  -0.02  -0.12  -0.08  0.k  -0.03 
(0.7)  (-1 .l)  (-6.3)  (-4.6)  (0.9)  (-2.5) 
CD  = Cobb-Douglas  production  function 
T  = translog  production  function 
T-statistics  in  parentheses 
. 
Appendix  E 
Duffy-Deno  and  Eberts  (1991)  attempt  to  resolve  the  reverse  causation 
argument  in  a  different  manner.  They  confront  the  issue  by  explicitly  mod- 
eling  the  simultaneous  relationship  between  public  capital  investment  and 
economic  growth  for  a  sample  of  twenty-eight  metropolitan  areas  in  the 
United  States  during  the  first  half  of  the  1980s.  Although  they  make  use  of 
personal  income  data  and  do  not  directly  estimate  production  function 
coefficients,  their  results  indicate  that  a  loh  increase  in  the  public  hapita 
stock  induces  a  0.094%  increase  in  personal  income  per  capita. 
Others  have  tried  to  determine  the  direction  of  causation  between  public 
capital  and  productivity  by  Granger-causation  techniques.  Using  roughly 
the  same  aggregate  data  sets  as  in  Aschauer  (1989a),  Holtz-Eakin  (1988) 
looked  at  the  association  between  public  capital  accumulation  and  private 
sector  productivity  growth  and  found  that  to  a  significant  extent  pubIic 
investment  spending  Granger-causes  a  productivity  growth.  Holtz-Eakin, 
though,  did  find  evidence  of  causation  in  the  opposite  direction  as  well. 
Appendix  F 
Table  5  lists  a  number  of  recent  studies  which  have  used  this  approach  to 
estimate  the  impact  of  public  capital  on  costs  of  production.  Morrison  and 
Schwartz  (1991.)  use  U.S.  state-level  data  for  the  total  manufacturing  sector 
over  the  period  1971  to  1987,  and  find  a  significant  shadow  share  of  public 
capital.  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas  (1991)  use  aggregate  data  on  twelve  manu- 
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facturing  industries  for  the  U.S.  from  1970  to  1986,  and  find  positive  social 
rates  of  return  on  infrastructure  capital.  Using  annual  data  over  the  period 
1960  to  1988,  Berndt  and  Hansson  (1991)  estimate  an  aggregate  cost  func- 
tion  for  Sweden  and  obtain  positive  shadow  share  estimates.  Conrad  and 
S,eitz  (1992)  find  significant  shadow  values  of  public  capital  for  three  indus- 
tries-manufacturing7  construction,  and  trade  and  transport-in  Germany 
over  the  period  1940  to  1988.  Lynde  and  Richmond  (1991)  find  that  public 
capital  significantly  reduces  average  costs  of  production  in  the  United 
Kingdom’s  manufacturing  industries  over  the  period  1966.1  to  1990.2 
(quarterly  data).  Shah  (1992)  estimates  a  positive  shadow  value  for  public 
capital  in  a  study  of  twenty-six  Mexican  manufacturing  industries  using 
data  from  1970  to  1987.  Finally,  Takahashi  and  Maki  (1992)  use  annual 
aggregate  data  for  Japan’s  manufacturing  sector,  and  find  a  significant 
shadow  value  of  total  and  core  infrastructure  capital  stocks. 
Table 5 
Public Capital and Costs of  Production 
Researchers  Geographical  scope 
h4orrison  &  Schwartz  State-level  (U.S.) 
Nadiri  &  Marn~~n~as  National  (Sweden) 
Industrial  scope 
Total  manufacturing 
..--..  _--.---.-. 
Private  business 
Total  manufacturing 
Bemdt  ti  Hansson  National  (Sweden)  Private  business 
Total  manufacturing 
Conrad  &  Seitz  National  (Germany)  Manufacturing 
Construction 
Trade  and  transport 
Lynde  &  Richmond  National  (U.K.)  Total  manufacturing 
Shah 
Takahashi  &  h4aki 
Appendix G 
Also  using  statelevel  data  but  focusing  on  manufacturing,  Morrison  and 
Schwartz  (1991)  generate  an  analogue  to  To&r’s  4  measure  for  private 
capital  to  assess  the  optimality  of  the  provision  of  public  capital  by  state 
governments. 
I 
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Morrison  and  Schwartz  find  that  their  q  variable-the  S!XX/O~.U  uche  of 
public  cupitai  divided  by  the  social  cost  of  ca@al-almost  always  exceeds 
unity  over  the  period  from  1971  to  1987.  They  conclude  that  Uit  appears 
that  infrastructure  investment  has  almost  invariably  been  too  low  for  social 
optimization.”  And  as  the  authors  recognize,  these  computations  may  sig- 
nificantly  underestimate  the  social  benefits  of  public  capital  since  the 
shadow  value  pertains  only  to  the  manufacturing  sector  and  ignores  the 
benefns  to  other  industries. 
Nadiri  and  Mamuneas  (1991)7  who  consider  the  aggregate  impact  of  public 
investment  on  twelve  two-digit  manufacturing  industries?  estimate  a  social 
rate  of  return  to  infrastructure  capital  of  0.068.  While  this  is  lower  than  the 
rates  of  return  to  private  capital  in  these  industries,  they  note  that  “these 
publicly  financed  capital  services  provide  benefits  to  other  producers  in  the 
economy..  .  ”  and  that  =when  appropriately  measured,  the  economy-wide 
rates  of  return  on  these  public  capital  services  are  likely  to  be  larger.” 
Indeed,  the  output  of  the  twelve  two-digit  industries  in  their  sample  consti- 
tutes  approximately  three-quarters  of  total  manufacturing  output  and  only 
one-sixth  of  total  private  sector  output  thus7  if  the  returns  to  other  manu- 
facturing  and  other  industries  were,  on  average,  equal  to  those  in  their  sam- 
ple,  the  social  rate  of  return  would  equal  0.091  and  0.408  respectively.  The 
former  estimate  would  be  rather  close  to  the  implied  social  rate  of  return  in 
LMorrison  and  Schwartz  (  19911,  while  the  latter  would  be  in  the  same  range 
as  the  aggregate  estimates  in  my  own  and  Munnell’s  aggregate  studies. 
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I.  htroductim 
Federal  programs  to  increase  spending  on 
infrastructure  figured  prominently  during  the 
1992  presidential  campaign,  attention  which 
culminates  a  remarkable  transformation  in 
the  debate  over  public  capital  spending.  For 
the  bulk  of  the  postwar  period,  discussion 
about  government  capital  budgeting  decisions 
largely  focused  on  their  pork-barrel  punch.  In 
1992,  however,  the  public  sector  capital 
stock  emerged  as  a  potent  force  for  improved 
macroeconomic  performance.  Proponents  of 
large-scale  infrastructure  programs  now 
argue  that  America’s  foundations  are  crum- 
bling,  impeding  its  ability  to  compete  interna- 
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tionally,  reducing  the  attractiveness  of  investments  in  the  United  States,  and 
lowering  the  earnings  of  U.S.  workers. 
A  careful  reading  of  the  evidence  suggests,  however,  four  truths  that  are  at 
odds  with  the  newly  conventional  wisdom:  1)  a  large-scale  infrastructure 
spending  progam  will  not  have  atiy  appreciable  effect  on  productivity 
growth;  2)  a  Federal  infrastructure  program  is  at  odds  with  the  efficient  use 
of  scarce  budget  dollars;  3)  there  are  6etter  infrastructure  policies  than  new 
spending  programs;  and  4)  policies  to  increase  private  sector  investment 
have  a  better  chance  to  improve  U.S.  competitiveness.  Understanding  of 
these  four  realities  should  guide  the  development  of  infrastructure  policies 
in  the  United  States,  and  wil1 argue  against  massive  new  Federal  involve- 
ment.  Stepping  back  a  bit,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  currently  fashionable 
emphasis  on  the  productivity  and  competitiveness  effects  of  public  capital  is 
misplaced.  Given  the  size  of  the  Federal  budget  deficit,  one  can  understand 
the  pressure  to  relabel  any  expenditure  as  an  investment.  LMoreover,  there 
are  equally  strong  incentives  to  address  U.S.  trade  performance.  But  infra- 
structure  spending  should  not  be  decided  by  its  public-relations  value; 
instead  it  should  be  driven  by  the  traditional  principle  of  careful  benefit- 
cost  analyses  for  each  proposed  project. 
1.  A  large-scale  infrastructure  spending  program  wii!  not  have  any  appre- 
ciab!e  effect  on  productivity  growth. 
Recent  interest  in  the  productivity  impact  of  public  sector  capital  stems 
from  the  influential  work  of  David  Aschauer  (Aschauer  1989a,  1989b).  In 
his,  and  much  of  the  subsequent,  research,  the  center  of  attention  is  the 
relationship  between  productive  inputs-private  capital  and  labor,  public 
capital-and  economic  activity,  or  output.  These  studies  summarize  this 
relationship  with  a  “production  function.”  [See  Appendix  A  for  a  discus- 
sion  of  this  statistical  relationship.] 
In  early  studies  of  the  productivity  effects  of  public  capital,  Aschauer 
(1989a),  Holtz-Eakin  (1988,1989)  and  Munnell(l99Oa)  examined  annual, 
postwar  data  for  the  United  States  to  estimate  the  parameters  of  such  a  pro- 
duction  function.  The  results  seemingly  argue  in  favor  of  infrastructure 
accumulation  as  a  key  determinant  of  productiviq  growth.  Unfortunately, 
the  nature  of  the  data  makes  it  impossible  to  place  faith  in  the  estimates. 
During  the  19%)~  and  196Os,  the  economy  fared  well  and,  as  a  result  of 
programs  like  construction  of  the  interstate  highway  system9  public  capital 
grew  rapidly.  In  the  early  1970~~ however,  productivity  growth  slowed  dra- 
matically.  In  the  absence  of  large  projects  and  with  the  maturation  of  the 
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baby-boom  generation,  so  did  government  capital  spending.  Mechanical 
application  of  statistical  techniques  might  tempt  one  to  conclude  that  there 
was  a  causal  relationship  running  from  slower  public  sector  capital  growth 
to  slower  productivity  growth.  More  likely,  however,  is  the  reverse  sce- 
nario.  Deteriorating  economic  conditions  tightened  government  budgets 
and  reduced  growth  of  the  public  capital  stock.  The  result  was  similar 
movements  in  the  two  series.  Indeed,  almost  every  broad-gauged  indicator 
of  economic  activity  contains  this  sharp  break  in  the  early  197Os,  and  the 
underlying  causes  of  the  slowdown  remain  unclear. 
Searching  for  convincing  evidence7  analysts  moved  to  the  “natural  laborato- 
ries”  of  the  U.S.:  the  states  and  their  governments.1  initially,  however,  these 
studies  largely  produced  controversy.  On  one  hand,  Munnell(l99Ob)  and 
Garcia-Mila  and  McGuire  (forthcoming}  concluded  that  differences  in  the 
amount  of  state  and  local  government  capital  was  an  important  source  of 
differences  in  states’  economic  performance.  On  the  other  hand,  Hulten  and 
Schwab  (l978,1991)  found  that  “residual”  state  growth-that  not 
accounted  for  by  growth  in  firms’  capital  and  labor-could  not  be 
attributed  to  state-local  highways,  roads,  sewers9  and  other  parts  of  public 
capital.  Indeed,  the  residual  was  at  odds  with  regional  patterns  of  public 
sector  investment. 
In  the  past,  I  have  argued  that  the  apparent  contradiction  is  easily  recon- 
ciled.  In  making  comparisons  across  states9  one  again  runs  the  risk  of 
reverse  causality:  successful  states  have  greater  resources  available  for  all 
uses,  including  government  capital  outlays,  leading  to  a  positive  association 
between  government  capital  and  productivity.  If  this  were  taken  at  face 
value,  one  might  again  mistakenly  conclude  that  greater  state  and  local  gov- 
ernment  capital  caused  superior  economic  performance.  Thus,  statistical 
techniques  used  to  investigate  the  productivity  effects  of  infrastructure  must 
be  tailored  to  avoid  this  pitfall.  The  approach  of  Hulten  and  Schwab 
(1991)  is  tantamount  to  using  such  a  technique.  Moreover,  direct  applica- 
tion  of  the  correct  statistical  approaches  yields  results  that  suggest  no  magic 
from  public  sector  capital  spending  programs  in  boosting  productivity 
growth.  The  third  row  of  Table  2  shows  estimates  of  the  productivity  effect 
of  public  capital.  The  first  column  repeats  the  conventional  analysis  (and 
finds  a  large,  positive  effect),  while  the  remainder  of  the  columns  show  cor- 
rected  estimates  (which  are  small  or  negative).  [See  Appendix  B  for  a  more 
detailed  discussion  of  these  issues.] 
I  hasten  to  stress  that  these  results  do  not  imply  that  the  large  stock  of 
infrastructure  in  the  United  States  provides  no  benefits.  Instead,  the  results 
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say  that  a  broad-based  spending  program  for  U&MO&  infrastructure  is 
unlikely  to  augment  economy-wide  productivity  growth.  This  should  hardly 
be  surprising.  On  average,  the  U.S.  has  a  superb  system  of  highways  and 
roads,  modern  utilities,  and  advanced  telecommunications  systems.  The 
productivity  effect  of  building,  say,  another  interstate  highway  system  could 
hardly  be  very  great,  and  certainly  not  worth  the  expense. 
Further,  the  very  nature  of  the  statistical  analysts  is  to  treat  all  public 
investments  in  all  locations  equally.  In  this  way9  they  answer  the  hypotheti- 
cal  question:  “What  is  the  effect  of  randomly  dropping  another  $1  of  infra- 
structure,  of  any  type,  anywhere  in  the  economy?”  For  an  infrastructure- 
starved  economy,  the  answer  would  be  “A  lot,”  but  this  is  hardly  the 
situation  in  the  United  States  as  a  whole. 
There  is  an  old  saying  that  there  are  three  kinds  of  lies:  lies,  damn  lies,  and 
statistics.  Skeptics  may  be  tempted  to  relegate  the  argument  thus  far  to  the 
third  category  and  push  forward  with  a  broad-based  expenditure  program 
aimed  at  the  U.S.  infrastructure.  But  even  the  most  optimistic  scenarios 
yield  only  marginal  improvements  in  economic  growth.  imagine  that  the 
U.S.  devotes  an  additional  !$Xj  billion  per  year  to  infrastructure  investment? 
an  enormous  commitment  of  resources  in  the  current  contexts  the  public 
capital  stock  would  grow  just  under  2  percentage  points  faster.  At  the 
extreme,  one  might  guess  that  GDP  growth  would  rise  by  one-quarter  of 
this  amount.  Thus,  even  this  large  investment  yields  under  one-half  a  per- 
centage  point  increase  in  economic  growth. 
Now,  over  several  decades,  a  one-half  a  percentage  point  increase  in  growth 
can  make  a  large  difference  in  living  standards.  The  point  is,  however,  that 
it  takes  decades  for  the  effect  to  cumulate-there  will  be  no  dramatic  turn- 
around  in  just  a  year  or  so-and  that  the  underpinnings  of  even  this  calcu- 
lation  are  extraordinarily  optimistic. 
2.  A  Federal  infrastructure  progmm  is  at  odds  with  the  efficietzt  z.ue  of 
scarce  hdget  dollars. 
The  preceding  section  argued  against  funneling  significant  new  budget  allo- 
cations  toward  infrastructure.  As  emphasized,  however,  the  aggregate  evi- 
dence  does  not  mean  that  there  are  no  capital  expenditure  projects  that 
would  survive  a  rigorous  benefit-cost  examination.  When  identified,  how- 
ever,  these  infrastructure  projects  should  not  be  a  Federal  government  pol- 
icy  concern.  Provision  of  infrastructure  has  traditionally  been  the  province 
of  state  and  local  governments,  on  the  grounds  that  local  officials  are  better 
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growing  evidence  that  these  governments  react  sensibly  to  the  economic 
environment,  both  in  their  employment  decisions  (e.g.,  Freeman  1987, 
Holtz-Eakin  and  Rosen  1991)  and  in  avoiding  irrational  swings  in  their 
capital  spending  (Holtz-Eakin  and  Rosen,  forthcoming).  Thus,  additional 
resources  will  be  less  likely  to  be  wasted  if  we  adhere  to  the  tradition  of 
reliance  on  local  decision-making. 
Further,  there  is  strong  evidence  that  state  needs  differ  greatly.  Table  1  is 
drawn  from  Holtz-Eakin  (forthcoming).  It  shows  the  ranking  of  states  on 
the  basis  of  the  average  annual  growth  rate  of  their  public  capital  stock 
from  1961  to  1974,  the  value  of  the  growth  rate  over  that  period,  and  the 
subsequent  growth  rate  between  1975  and  1988.  The  table  drives  home  the 
range  of  diversity  in  the  states’  experience.  It  is  true-as  has  been  widely 
noted-that  there  was  a  sharp  decline  in  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation 
between  the  early  and  later  years  in  the  sample;  a  decline  that  the  evidence 
prcscntcd  above  suggests  is  the  result  of  poorer  aggregate  economic  perfor- 
mance.  The  tendency  to  focus  on  the  nation  as  a  whole,  however,  hides  the 
rather  pronounced  differences  in  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation  across  the 
states,  with  the  highest  (Alaska)  exceeding  the  bottom  end  (California)  by  a 
factor  of  roughly  20.  Even  more  interesting,  there  is  little  relationship 
between  growth  in  the  early  period  and  growth  in  recent  years.  The  notion 
that  all  parts  of  the  U.S.  have  been  subject  to  a  uniform  decline  in  infra- 
structure  does  not  square  with  the  facts. 
Table  1  is  persuasive  evidence  that  a  single  national  policy  toward  infra- 
structure  accumulation  would  be  unwarranted.  Proponents  might  argue,  of 
course?  that  a  “Federal”  policy  need  not  imply  a  simplistic,  equaldivision 
approach.  The  politics  of  a  large  Federal  program,  however,  certainly 
would  lead  to  earmarking-in  either  an  explicit  or  disguised  fashion-some 
part  of  the  budget  for  each  state.  This  would  be  tantamount  to  implement- 
ing  the  hypothetical  experiment  envisioned  above:  randomly  raining  infra- 
structure  funding  evexywhere  in  the  economy,  to  little  effect.  The  Federal 
government  could  fund  additional  state-local  spending,  of  course,  via 
grants-in-aid.  To  be  cffcctivc,  however,  such  a  program  need  necessarily 
avoid  restrictions  on  the  use  of  Federal  dollars.  That  is,  an  efficient  Federal 
program  must  leave  room  for  local  officials  to  either  cut  local  taxes  or 
spend  the  aid  to  meet  other  objectives?  and  it  is  hard  to  imagine  that  these 
objectives-however  sensible  they  may  seem  from  a  local  perspective- 
would  be  well  received  in  Washington. 
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Table  1 
Growth  Rate  of  State  and  Local  Government  Capital  Per  Capita 
@scent per  year) 
Annual  Growth  Rate 
Rank  State  1961-74  197.F88 
AIaska  9.64  3.14 
District  of  Columbia  6.89  4.01 
Kentucky  S.88  0.80  -  .- 
Delaware  S.68  -0.62 
5  Wyoming 
6  South  Dakota 
7  Nebraska 
8  Mississippi 
9  Tennessee 
10  West  Virginia 
11  North  Dakota 
12  Montana 
13  Hawaii 
14  Alabama 
S.01  2.28 
4.92  1.22 
4.81  1.64 
4.6s  0.30 
4.63  0.26 
4.56  0.90 
4.47  0.75  -~ 
4.20  o.s9 
4.08  0.90 
4.04  O.S4  -  - 
1s  Maryland  4.00  1.44 
16  Arkansas  3.98  0.63 
17  Virginia  3.92  0.37 
18  South  Carolina  3.91  1.30 
19  Texas  3.90  1.20  ~ 
20  Missouri  3.80  0.33  .  ~~~ 
21  Georgia  3.70  1.60 
22  Iowa  3.s9  1.15  .- 
23  Minnesota  3*S8  0.80 
24  Kansas  3.54  0.86 
2.5  Wisconsin  3.S2  0.0s 
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New  Mexico 
Illinois 












3.38  -1.18  - 
3.36  0.97 
3.34  1.87  - 
3.33  -0.22 
3.20  0.73 
3.13  052 
3.10  0.91 
3.03  0.74 
3.00  1.08 
2.96  -0.0s  --~ 
2.84  0.54 
2.78  1.81 
2.76  0.29 
2.70  -0.3s 
2.57  0.46 
2.43  0.03 
2.32  1.00 
2.18  -0.51 














New  Hampshire 
Colorado 
United  States 
2.08  0.72 
2.05  0.63  _. 
2.02  0.09  -.- 
1.93  1.39 
1.92  -0.14 
1.87  -057 
1.6s  1.41  -~- 
3.08  0.46 
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One  common  objection  to  reliance  on  local  decisions  for  infrastructure 
spending  is  the  notion  that  infrastructure  benefits  “spill  over”  from  one 
state  or  region  to  its  neighbors.  Operating  in  isolation,  policymakers  fail  to 
recognize  these  extra  benefits,  leading  to  underinvestment.  The  Federal  gov- 
ernment,  the  argument  continues,  is  uniquely  positioned  to  solve  the  prob- 
lem  of  uncounted,  external  benefits  by  coordinating  the  investment  activi- 
ties  of  the  sub-Federal  governments. 
The  argument  is  one  part  of  the  textbook  tension  between  the  efficiency  of 
a  federalist  system  and  the  benefits  of  centralized  policies.  Unfortunately, 
when  confronted  with  the  data,  the  textbook  argument  gets  cut  short  early: 
there  is  no  evidence  of  large  interstate  productivity  spillovers.  Specifically, 
in  the  work  discussed  earlier  (Holtz-Eakin  1992)  I  repeated  the  analysis 
summarized  herein  in  Table  2,  using  instead  data  for  eight  U.S.  regions.  In 
the  presence  of  significant  cross-state  spillover  cffccts,  one  would  expect 
that  moving  from  the  state  level  to  the  regional  level  would  permit  one  to 
capture  these  benefits,  thereby  resulting  in  larger  effects  from  public 
capital.2  Instead,  the  estimates  are  virtually  identical  to  those  obtained  at 
the  state  level,  negating  the  importance  of  external  effects. 
*Most recently,  a  new  argument  has  been  raised  in  favor  of  a  Federal  infra- 
structure  spending  program:  that  it  would  provide  stimulus  needed  to 
recover  from  the  most  recent  recession.  This  argument  has  Hothing  to  do 
with  the  virtues  of  infrastructure  per  se.  Instead,  it  rehes  soleIy  on  the  mer- 
its  of  directly  stimulating  aggregate  demand  and  employment.  A  full 
appraisal  of  the  virtues  of  using  fiscal  policy  for  stabilization  purposes 
would  lead  this  discussion  too  far  afield.  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that 
using  infrastructure  spending  for  such  objectives  will  be  inefficient.  At  the 
close  of  such  a  stabilization  episode-regardless  of  its  short-run  stimulative 
success-there  is  the  virtual  guarantee  of  having  wasted  significant  invest- 
ment  funds  on  the  wrong  types  of  capital  in  all  the  wrong  places. 
3.  7%~  are  better  infrastructure  policies  than  new  spending  programs. 
The  newly  conventional  wisdom  hinges  on  anecdotes  of  outdated  infra- 
structure  that  is  badly  in  need  of  repair  and  overly  congested.  Of  course, 
one  might  argue  that  this  is  exactly  what  to  expect  when  infrastructure-or 
anything  else-is  free  to  use,  and  when  there  is  no  incentive  to  maintain 
past  investments  appropriately.  From  this  perspective,  the  best  infrastruc- 
ture  program  does  not  focus  on  new  spending.  Instead,  the  top  priority 
should  be  to  “get  the  prices  right”  where  feasible  by  charging  user  fees  for 
infrastructure  services.  User  fees  would  serve  to  reduce  excessive  demands on  the  infrastructure  and  at  the  same  time  would  provide 
funds  for  purposes  of  maintenance  and  modernization. 
a  secure 
User  fees  are  not  the  answer  to  all  infrastructure  problems,  but  are  the  most 
promising  path  in  the  most  high-profile  of  problems:  airports,  water  supply, 
port  facilities,  landfills,  waste  treatment7  bridges,  and  highways.  Techno- 
logical  advances  in  scanners  and  sensing  mechanisms  have  eliminated  the 
concern  that  user  fees  are  impractical  and  have  served  to  make  user  fees 
administratively  feasible.  It  is  no  longer  the  case,  for  example?  that  charging 
tolls  to  control  peak  congestion  automatically  backfires  by  causing  endless 
delays  at  toll  booths.  There  also  has  been  concern  that  reliance  on  user  fees 
would  be  unnecessarily  hard  on  the  poor,  but  the  Wfairness”  of  user  fees 
should  be  compared  to  the  alternative.  Small  (1983)  points  out  that  high- 
way  tolls  can  make  OH income  classes  better  off,  if  the  revenues  are  used  to 
lower  property  taxes,  or  replace  registration  and  fuel  taxes. 
Pricing  the  use  of  our  existing  infrastructure  efficiently  is  best  viewed  as  an 
essential  part  of  any  infrastructure  spending  program.  To  determine  the 
appropriate  size  of  a  project,  one  must  forecast  use  of  the  facility,  and  this 
is  integrally  related  to  the  price  charged.  By  revealing  the  intensity  of 
demand  for  services  provided  by  public  capital,  user  fees  may  improve  the 
planning  process.  Further,  when  user  fees  are  dedicated  to  maintenance  and 
modernization,  funds  will  be  available  for  repairs  at  the  appropriate  time  in 
the  life-cycle  of  roads,  bridges,  sewers,  and  other  facilities. 
In  the  past,  there  has  been  little  or  no  accounting  made  for  maintenance 
expenditures?  making  it  impossible  to  reward  timely  maintenance,  which  is 
typically  more  cost-effective  than  new  construction.  Even  worse,  for  much 
of  the  postwar  period,  Federal  policy  (via  matching  grants,  especially  for 
highways  and  water  treatment  plants)  subsidized  new  investment  relative  to 
maintenance.  Local  governments  responded  predictably  to  these  perverse 
incentives  with  insufficient  maintenance  and  excessive  construction  plans. 
While  there  has  been  progress  on  this  front  in  recent  years  (in,  for  example, 
the  recent  Federal  surface  transportation  bill),  a  widespread  move  toward 
the  use  of  efficient  infrastructure  prices  remains  a  promising  avenue  for 
reform. 
4.  PoZL%?s to 
improve  U.S. 
increase  private  sector 
competitiveness. 
investment  have  a  better  cbarfce  to 
At  one  level,  the  argument  is  simple.  If  additional  infrastructure  will  have 
negligible  productivity  effects,  private  investment  simply  has  to  be  better. 
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Indeed,  public  investment  is  even  more  costly  than  it  might  appear  because 
by  transferring  $1  of  investment  from  the  private  sector  to  the  public  sec- 
tor,  one  gives  up  a  productive  private  investment  for  nothing  in  return. 
Viewed  from  this  perspective,  a  case  can  be  made  for  “budgeting”  addi- 
tional  investment  by  reducing  the  Federal  deficit  and  thereby  freeing  up 
additional  capital  for  use  by  private  firms,  rather  than  by  spending  on 
Federal  programs.  Importantly,  the  “zero  effect”  discussed  above  is  not  the 
key  to  this  argument.  Instead,  the  guiding  rule  is  that  the  return  on  private 
investment  exceeds  that  on  public  investment,  a  result  consistent  with  all 
but  the  most  extreme  studies  of  infrastructure  effects.  [See  Appendix  C.] 
II.  Conclusion 
The  threads  of  the  argument  may  now  be  spun  together.  First,  the  statistical 
foundations  cannot  support  the  claim  that  public  capital  is  the  key  to  faster 
productivity  growth  in  the  United  States.  Second,  to  the  extent  that  there 
are  infrastructure  needs  in  the  U.S.,  they  differ  greatly  across  the  country. 
Such  needs  are  best  addressed  in  the  traditional  fashion  by  state  and  local 
governments,  and  to  the  extent  that  the  Federal  government  provides  aid?  it 
would  be  wasteful  to  embody  mandates  or  other  restrictions  on  its  use. 
Indeed,  the  most  appealing  policy  toward  infrastructure  does  not  focus  on 
new  spending  at  all.  Instead,  it  would  focus  on  the  efficient  use  of  our  exist- 
ing  public  capital  stock  through  user  fees  and  other  pricing  schemes. 
Finally,  most  of  the  evidence  suggests  that  private  investment  spending 
would  have  more  beneficial  productivity  effects  than  new  public  capital 
spending.  Indeed,  even  some  of  the  evidence  used  in  favor  of  an  infrastruc- 
ture  program  is  best  interpreted  in  this  way.  In  sum,  the  case  for  a  big,  new 
Federal  program  for  infrastructure  is  weak. 
At  the  same  time,  the  current  fixation  with  the  productivity  and  competi- 
tiveness  effects  of  public  capital  is  misplaced.  Should  the  government  pur- 
sue  policies  conducive  to  more  rapid  economic  growth,  improved  interna- 
tional  competitiveness,  and  higher  real  earnings  for  workers?  Where 
possible,  of  course.  Should  these  goals  be  the  metric  by  which  we  judge  the 
desirability  of  each  and  every  dollar  of  capital  spending  by  our  govern- 
ments?  No,  of  course  not.  Tt is  an  axiom  as  old  as  the  field  of  public  finance 
itself  that  public  sector  projects  should  be  judged  by  comparing  their  bene- 
fits  to  their  costs.  If  the  difference  is  positive,  the  project  is  worthwhile  and 
merits  funding. 
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Measuring  benefits  appropriately  is  very  difficult.  Investment  projects  are 
by  definition  long-lived,  so  benefits  in  both  the  present  and  future  must  be 
counted.  Infrastructure  projects  affect  the  population  as  a  whole,  so  bene- 
fits  received  by  many  individuals  and  firms  must  be  calculated  and  added 
up  on  a  consistent  basis.  The  list  of  pitfalls  goes  on  and  on.  lt  is  safe  to  say, 
however,  that  no  one  would  argue  in  favor  of  drawing  the  line  at  greater 
productivity.  If  subways  are  safer  and  cleaner,  and  the  public  happier  as  a 
result,  this  too  should  count  as  a  benefit.  If  better  roads  reduce  commuting 
times  and  the  result  is  the  same  work  but  more  leisure,  this  should  count  as 
a  benefit.  In  general,  the  cons~@on  value  of  the  services  produced  by 
infrastructure  and  other  capital  should  count  just  as  much  as  increased  pro- 
ductivity. 
Thus,  some  projects  may  be  worthwhile  even  though  public  capital  spend- 
ing  is  a  poor  candidate  to  resolve  the  productivity  problem  in  the  United 
States.  Projects  of  sufficient  value  will  pass  a  routine  examination  of  the 
pros  and  cons.  With  equal  force,  a  great  many  projects  will  fail  reasonable 
benefit-cost  comparisons.  Each  capital  project  should  undergo  such  scrutiny 
by  those  best  equipped  to  evaluate  it. 
In  their  haste  to  get  on  with  spending,  proponents  of  the  “infrastructure  cri- 
sis”  view  of  the  productivity  slowdown  will  likely  circumvent  this  type  of 
detailed  policy  analysis.  The  outcome  will  be  unnecessarily  large  and  (by 
definition)  wasteful  expenditures.  In  the  end,  a  large  infrastructure  spending 
program  at  the  Federal  level  is  not  the  magic  solution  to  U.S.  economic 
woes.  It  is  a  genie  best  left  in  the  bottle. 
Appendix  A 
The  production  function  is  written: 
Equation  1 
qr  =  Pot  +  hh  +  I324 +  I%&  +  Et 
where  qt  is  the  logarithm  of  private  output,  !Q is  the  logarithm  of  private 
capital  inputs,  it  is  the  logarithm  of  labor  inputs,  gt  is  the  logarithm  of  pub- 
lic  sector  capital,  and  &r is  the  residual,  unexplained  output.  The  parameters 
of  the  production  function  (l$,  p2,  PJ)  measure  the  contribution  of  each  of 
the  inputs  to  the  productive  process.  For  example,  if  l33 =  0,  then  invest- 
ments  in  public  capital  have  no  effect  on  output  or  productivity.  Further,  by 
entering  the  variables  in  logarithms,  the  vs  may  be  interpreted  as  elastici- 
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ties.  To  give  another  example,  if  &  =  0.0ZT9 a  10  percent  increase  in  govern- 
ment  capital  would  result  in  a  one-half  percent  increase  in  private  output. 
At  the  heart  of  the  claim  that  infrastructure  spending  is  the  key  to  faster 
productivity  growth  is  the  notion  that  &  is  both  positive  and  large. 
Appendix  B 
To  see  the  argument  clearlyV modify  Equation  1  to  keep  track  of  states  (s) 
and  permit  each  state  to  have  a  different  underlying  productive  ability  (fJ. 
These  differences  stem  from  such  natural  sources  as  location,  climate,  and 
mineral  endowments,  as  well  as  such  inherited  features  as  the  pattern  of 
industrialization.  The  result  is  a  slightly  modified  production  function  that 
looks  Ii ke: 
Consider  now  Table  2,  which  is  drawn  from  Holtz-Eakin  (1992).3  Column 
(1)  contains  the  results  of  the  conventional  (ordinary  least  squares)  statisti- 
cal  approach  to  estimating  the  p’s  in  Equation  1.  For  purposes  of  this  dis- 
cussion,  the  key  result  is  that  the  estimated  &  is  0.20.  Thus,  boosting  the 
growth  of  the  public  capital  stock  by  5  percentage  points  would  increase 
productivity  growth  by  a  full  percentage  point.  However9  this  result  is  an 
artifact  of  using  inappropriately  simple  techniques. 
The  problem  stems  from  ignoring  the  fs: states  with  a  ubig”  fs will  have 
more  output  and  greater  incomes  (directly  from  [2]).  They  are  also  likely  to 
spend  more  public  programs,  leading  to  a  greater  gSt.  (They  are  also  likely 
to  be  better  places  to  Iive  and  invest,  affecting  &  and  fSt at  the  same  time.) 
What  one  “sees”  is  the  positive  association  bmeen  gti  and  qSr,  which  is 
mistakenly  transformed  into  a  prescription  for  spending  on  gSt in  order  to 
raise  qSr. 
The  remainder  of  the  columns  of  the  table  are  devoted  to  determining  how 
well  this  result  stands  up  to  closer  scrutiny  by  trying  different  means  to  cir- 
cumvent  the  presence  of  the  fs in  Equation  2.  Column  (2)  shows  the  results 
of  focusing  on  changes  in  both  sides  (2)  between  1969  and  19%  Notice 
that  by  using  changes,  the  fs are  eliminated.  That  is9 changes  over  time  in 
each  state  depend  only  on  the  growth  of  inputs  and  the  parameters,  and  are 
independent  of  (unchanging)  differences  across  states.  To  the  extent  that 
public-sector  capital  is  an  important  determinant  of  long-run  productivity 
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growth,  it  seems  reasonable  to  expect  that  it  manifest  itself  over  a  period  of 
nearly  two  decades.  What  is  the  result?  Looking  at  column  (2),  the  estimate 
of  the  impact  of  public  capital  (l&)  is  now  negative.  However,  because  of 
the  large  standard  error,  one  is  best  left  with  the  conclusion  that  &  is  essen- 
tially  zero. 
Columns  (3)  through  (6)  aim  progressively  greater  extremes  of  statistical 
firepower  toward  the  goal  of  discerning  the  correct  value  for  &+  Without 
helaboring  the  details,  two  important  conclusions  emerge.  First,  a  formal, 
statistical  test  strongly  supports  the  presence  and  importance  of  the  fs- 
states  really  are  different,  and  these  differences  complicate  the  analysis  of 
their  economies.4  Second,  and  more  to  the  heart  of  the  debate,  the  single 
best  estimate  of  the  productivity  impact  of  public  capital  is  zero.  Indeed, 
another  way  to  look  at  the  results  in  this  table  is  that  there  is  only  one  way 
to  get  the  “big  effect-  answer.  Any  other  cut  at  the  data  suggests  that  any 
usmoking  gun”  in  the  death  of  productivity  growth  does  not  lie  in  the 
hands  of  infrastructure  policy. 
Appendix  C 
Most  studies  of  infrastructure  focus  only  on  whether  public  capital  has  pro- 
ductivity  effects  at  all,  not  whether  these  effects  are  larger  than  those  for 
private  capital.  In  terms  of  the  production  function  in  (l),  the  ratio  of  the 
productivity  effect  of  public  versus  private  capital  is  given  by: 
Equation  3 
Public  Capital  Output  Effect  =  & 
Public  Capital  Otitput  Effect 
In  the  research  discussed  earlier,  I  estimate  that  the  mean  ratio  of  non-resi- 
dential  fixed  capital  to  state-local  capital  in  the  states  is  in  the  vicinity  of  2. 
This  implies  that  the  estimate  of  l33 need  be  at  least  one-half  that  of  &  for 
the  pure  productivity  effect  of  public  capital  to  he  larger  than  that  of  pri- 
vate  capital.5  Notice  that  even  the  upward-biased  estimate  of  p-3 just  barely 
makes  the  grade.  Thus,  for  the  data  to  reveal  a  need  for  greater  increasing 
infrastructure,  it  is  not  enough  to  show  a  positive  productivity  effect. 
Instead,  the  estimated  value  of  l33 must  meet  this  more  stringent  test,  which 
is  likely  for  only  the  most  implausibly  optimistic  estimates. 
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Table  2* 
Estimates  of  State  Production  Functim 
Variable 
Dependent  Variable: 
Log  Private  Gross  State  Product 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
OLS  LONG  FIX  GLS  IV  HNR 
Log  Labor  0.497  0.643  0.691  0.659  0.542  0.911 
(0.0144)  (0.137)  (0.0262)  (0.022s)  (0.0747)  (O.OS30) 
Log  Private  Capital  0.359  0.504  0.301  0.36  1  0.472  0.106 
(0.0112)  (0.142)  (0.0302)  (0.0233)  (0.0653)  (0.0253) 
Log  Public  Capital  0.203  -0.115  -Los1  7  0.00770  -0.0150  -0.102 
(0.0190)  (0.126)  (0.0267)  (0.0235)  (0.0660)  (0.0606) 
Log  Private 
Capital/Lab  -  -  -  -  - 
or 
Log  Public 
Capital/Lab 
or 
-  -  -  -  - 
Time  Effects  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Srate  Effects  No  No  Fixed  Random  No  Differences 
*For definitions  of  variably  see  Holtz-hkin  (1992).  *OLY’  is ordinary  least  squares,  “LONG” 
is  long-differences:  19%  values  minus  1969  values,  TX”  is  conventional  fixed  effects  cstima- 
tion,  “GLS” is conventional  random  effects  esrimarion,  UIVm is  an  instrumental  variables  &ma- 
tar  using  orher  stares’  dara  as  instruments,  and  “HNR”  is  an  instrumenral  variables  estimator  of 
a  first-differenced  equation. 
Notes 
1.  Other  studies  looked  at  cross-national  comparisons  of  productivity  growth  (e.g., 
Aschauer  1989b),  but  the  difficulty  in  finding  comparable  data  and  correcting  for 
vast  differences  in  governmental  structures  has  made  for  rather  unstable  parameter 
estimates  (see  Tanzi  19901. 
2.  It  is  also  possible  for  the  effects  to  be  smaller  as  one  looks  at  larger  geographic 
areas.  One  pitfall  of  local  development  strategies  is  that  they  may  attract  busi- 
nesses  and  workers  largely  at  the  expense  of  neighboring  jurisdictions.  The  right 
measure  of  the  effect  on  overall  economic  growth  is  the  diffmencz  in  productivity 
in  the  two  jurisdictions,  not  just  the  economic  growth  experienced  in  the  chosen 
jurisdiction.  There  have  been  many  careful  studies  using  regional  and  municipal 
data  (see,  e.g.,  Duffy-Deno  and  Eberts  1989  and  Eberts  1986,1?9Oa,  199Ob).  One 
must  be  careful  in  interpreting  in  these  studies  in  order  to  avoid  overstating  the 
impact  of  public  capital  at  the  national  level. 
3.  See  Holtz-Akin  (1992)  and  Holtz-Eakin  (forthcoming)  for  a  more  extensive  dis- 
cussion  of  the  underlying  data  and  statistical  techniques. 
4.  The  test,  due  to  Hausman  and  Taylor  (198  1  ),  compares  the  parameter  estimates 
from  the  fixed  effects  estimator  to  those  from  the  random  effects,  or  generalized 
least  squares  (GLS),  estimator. 
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5.  This  overstates  any  preference  for  public  investment  because  it  ignores 
tionary  costs  of  raising  revenues  to  finance  public  capital  outlays. 
the  distor- 
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